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Abstract—A problem of developing the consensus protocols in
public blockchain systems which spend a combination of energy
and space resources is addressed. A technique is proposed that
provides a flexibility for selection of the energy and space resources
which should be spent by a player participating in the consensus
procedure. The technique originates from the cryptographic time-
memory-data trade-off approaches for cryptanalysis. The proposed
technique avoids the limitations of Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-
of Space (PoS) which require spending of only energy and space,
respectively. Also, it provides a flexibility for adjusting the resources
spending to the system budget. The proposed consensus technique
is based on a puzzle where the problem of inverting one-way
function is solved employing a dedicated Time-Memory-Data Trade-
Off (TMD-TO) paradigm. The algorithms of the consensus protocol
are proposed which employ certain unconstrained and constrained
TMD-TO based inversions. Security of the proposed technique is
considered based on the probability that the honest pool of nodes
generate a longer extension of the blockchain before its update,
and a condition on the employed parameters in order to achieve
desired security have been derived. Implementation complexity of
the proposed consensus protocol is discussed and compared with
the complexities when PoW and PoS are employed.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Consensus, Security, Proof of Work,
Proof of Space
I. INTRODUCTION
In a large number of scenarios we face particular instan-
tiations of the following general problem: All updates of a
huge database should be verified before becoming effective.
A generic approaches for performing the varication is the
centralized one where a trusted party check and verifies all the
updates. The main problem with this approach is necessity of
exitance a third trusted party as well as the the generic problem
of the single point of failure. Recently, as an alternative
approach, the blockchain paradigm has been proposed within
the bitcoin proposal [9], where the verification is performed
in a distributed manner without requirement for the third
trusted party as the verification arbiter. The removal of the
third trusted party and the distributed verification approach
requires an appropriate technique for achieving the verification
decision: For this purpose the blockchain based verification
employs the so called consensus protocol. This consensus
protocol appears as a system overhead. We could say that
the escape from the centralized verification paradigm should
be paid by the overhead related to the required blockchain
consensus protocol. The overheads implied by the employed
consents protocol could be very large and it is an open research
issue to construct dedicated consensus algorithms in order
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to minimize the overheads in a system based on blockchain
technology.
An illustrative simplified framework of a system based on
the blockchain paradigm is given in Fig.1
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Fig. 1. A simplified architecture of a class of blockchain based systems.
The consensus protocol is an algorithm which specifies the
procedure for generation a candidate block for inclusion into
the blockchain, i.e. update/extension of the blockchain with a
verified new block.
A lot of consensus protocols for blockchain based system
have been proposed and the surveys [13], [11] and [14], for
example, provide summary of the main approaches. For the
purposes of this paper, we point out to the following two
paradigm for achieving the consensus: Proof of Work (PoW)
and Proof of Space (PoS) known also as Proof of Memory
(PoM).
PoW approach, initially employed for protection against e-
mail spam and denial of service, has been introduced in [4]:
It is a proof approach in which a prover, the party, which
claims spending of some resources, convinces a verifier that
some computation with respect to some statement x has been
spent. An illustration of PoW technique is the following: Let
H(·) be a hash-function which hashes the concatenation of
given binary sequence x and a randomly selected seed s so
that H(s||x) begins with certain number t of zeros. Assuming
that H(·) acts as a random function, the prover must evaluate
H(s||x) on 2t different values of s (in expectation) before
ending with a required s. Accordingly, the resource to be
spend for PoW approaches is energy. Nowadays, a family of
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2PoW approaches appear as the most widespread paradigm for
securing the blockchains.
PoS is another paradigm for the consensus protocols - It is
based on a proof that certain space/menory has been booked
for participation in the consensus protocol, i.e. the resource
which should be spent is ”memory”. A simple illustration of
the approach is the following: the verifier specify a random
function f which maps a space of dimension N into the same
dimensional space. During the initialization phase, the prover
should compute the function table of f and sort it by the
output values. During the verification phase, to convince the
verifier that prover posses the table, the prover must invert
f on a random challenge. The previous is just an illustration
of PoS underlying paradigm, but this simple PoS appears as
the insecure one. A secure PoS has been proposed in [5]
employing certain graphs in order to avoid time-memory trade-
off approach for inversion reported in [6]. The approach [5] is
such that a cheating prover needs Θ(N) space or time after the
challenge is known to make the response which the verifier
accepts. An application of this PoS has been employed for
developing a crypto-currency reported in [10]. Another PoS
has been proposed in [1] based on inverting random functions
from a class of functions that are hard to evaluate in the
forward direction, and even harder to invert. [1] points out
that we only need to be able to compute the entire function
table in time linear (or quasilinear) in the size of the input
domain. [1] provides construction of functions satisfying this
relaxed condition and proves lower bounds on time-memory
trade-offs beyond the upper bounds given in [6].
Motivation for the Work. PoW based consensus is based on
a puzzle which should be solved employing energy only:
The underlying problem has such nature that employment
of a memory does not help. On the other hand PoS (PoM)
based consensus are built over the problems which could be
efficiently solved (solved within given time slots) only if a
memory large enough is employed and in this approach par-
ticular attention is payed in order to avoid possibility of using
time-memory trade-off (i.e. energy-space trade-off) to obtain
any benefit. So, a player who participate in the system running
(operating), usually called a miner, has no option: The miner
must employ a single type of the resources: energy or space -
a combination is not allowed. We believe that in a number of
scenarios a miner should have opportunity to design the mining
budget based on a combination of different resources, and in
particular a combination of energy and space in order to deal
with solving the consensus puzzle. The flexibility in selection
of the resources to be spend is also important in a context of
the incentive required for a miner when the mining should be
performed only for a small fee. On the other hand, we point
out that the existing PoW and PoS underlying problems are
intentionally selected in order that efficient time-memory or
time-memory-data trade-offs (see [6] and [2], for example) can
not be employed. Note, PoW and PoS are built on the same
paradigms as the cryptanalysis of encryption employing the
exhaustive search or the code-book table, respectively. Recall
that the exhaustive search cryptanalysis assumes search for a
solution based on testing all possible candidates for the keys,
and the codebook based cryptanalysis assumes construction
of certain table with the pairs (key, ciohertext) which provides
inversion in the look-up manner. On the other hand, time-
memory trade-off (TM-TO) and time-memory-data trade-off
(TMD-TO) have been introduced to provide trade-offs of
the resources required for the cryptanalysis. Consequently,
our motivation is consideration of design consensus protocols
based on the TM-TO (TMD-TO) approaches for trade-off
between the resources a miner should employ.
Summary of the Results. This paper proposes a technique for
the consensus in public blockchain systems. The proposed
technique provides a flexibility for selection of the resources
which should be spent by a player participating in the con-
sensus procedure. It provides a possibility for different trade-
offs between the required energy and space which should
be spent during execution of the consensus protocol. The
technique originates from the cryptographic time-memory-data
trade-off approaches for cryptanalysis. The proposed technique
avoids the limitations of PoW and PoS which require spending
of only energy and space, respectively. Also, it provides a
flexibility for adjusting the resources spending to the system
budget. The differences of the developed consensus protocol
in comparison with the previously reported ones are the puzzle
which has to be solved, construction of the challenge for
the puzzle, and the technique for solving the problem. The
proposed consensus technique is based on a puzzle where the
problem of inverting one way function is solved employing
dedicated TMD-TO. Algorithms for the consensus protocol
are proposed including dedicated ones for specific inversion
problems of one way function where the challenge is an `-bits
binary prefix (or suffix) C of a ciphertext and the inversion
yields one of the keys which encrypt n-bits all ones binary
vector into an n-bits binary ciphertext with the given prefix
C, where ` ≤ n. Two options for the inversion problem
are considered: the unconstrained one and a constrained one.
Security of the proposed technique is considered based on the
probability that the honest nodes generate a longer extension
of the blockchain before its update, and a condition on the
employed parameters in order to achieve desired security
have been derived. Implementation complexity of the proposed
consensus protocol is discussed and compared with with the
complexities when PoW and PoS are employed.
Organization of the Paper. A framework for the puzzle em-
ployed in the consensus protocol is given in Section II. The
algorithms of the consensus protocol when an unconstrained
and constrained TMD-TO based inversions are employed are
proposed in Sections III and IV, respectively. Section V yields
a security evaluation of the the proposed consensus algorithm.
A discussion of implementation complexity of the proposed
approach and comparison with the ones based on PoW and
PoS are given in Section VI. Finally, some concluding notes
are given in Section VII.
II. A CONSENSUS PROTOCOLS BASED ON THE PUZZLE
REPLACEMENT
This section proposes a modification of the traditional
PoW consensus protocol where hash-function based puzzle is
3replaced with a novel one.
A. The Consensus Protocol
The consensus protocol proposed in this section follows
the same framework as the traditional consensus protocols for
public blockchains based on PoW employed in Bitcoin and
Ethereum. Each execution of these protocols consists of the
following main phases: (i) Construction a block of transac-
tions; (ii) Solving a puzzle; (iii) Inclusion the considered block
into the blockchain (assuming that no one transaction from
the block has been already included in the blockchain). The
main differences of the novel blockchain consensus protocol
in comparison with the previously reported ones are the puzzle
which has to be solved and construction of the challenge for
the puzzle.
B. The Employed Puzzle and the Solving Method
The puzzle for the consensus protocol proposed in this paper
requires, as the first step, construction of a challenge for the
puzzle which should be solved. The challenge is specified as
follows:
(a) find a nonce, which after added to the binary representation
of the block, provides that hash value of the block with the
nonce begins with certain number of zeros;
(b) take certain number of bits from the hash vector and form
the binary challenge vector.
The step (a) could employ the same hash-function as employed
in Bitcoin and Ethereum consensus protocols and could be
considered as a mini PoW. The bits selected in the step (b)
could be from arbitrary positions of the hash vector, and as
a particular instantiation they could be a suffix (or prefix) of
the hash value. Fig. 2 illustrates the approach employed for
construction of the challenge for the puzzle which should be
solved later on.
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Fig. 2. Paradigm of the challenge construction for the puzzle problem.
The puzzle itself is an inversion problem for the given
challenge: The challenge is considered as the prefix/suffix
of a ciphertxt generated by certain encryption algorithm for
the all ones message (or any other given message), and the
puzzle problem is to find a key which provides mapping of the
message into the considering ciphertext. The puzzle paradigm
is illustrated in Fig. 3. Note that this inversion problem could
have a lot of solutions because the message is longer than the
challenge.
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Fig. 3. Paradigm of the puzzle.
As the method for solving the puzzle, this paper pro-
poses employment of a dedicated time-memory-data trade-
off (TMD-TO) approach. This approach belongs to a family
of cryptanalytic approaches which are the generic ones for
cryptanalysis of certain encryption schemes. The proposed
approach originate from the TM-TO technique proposed in [6]
and later-on generalized in a number of papers. The method
for solving the puzzle problem, i.e. the inversion problem, is
illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5, and will be in details explained in
the next two sections. This approach follows some underlying
ideas reported in [7] and [8], as well. The general paradigm
of TMD-TO approach is employment of certain suitably
constructed table/tables - these tables should be constructed
in advance during the so called pre-processing phase and later
on used for all inversions of the considered class. Each table
consists just two columns: The second column row element
is evaluated through a number of recursive recalculations with
the first element of the row as the staring argument as follows:
[xi,j+1||ri,j+1] = f([xi,j ||ri,j ]) ,
j = 0, 1, ...t− 1, i = 1, 2, ...,m ,
where [xi,j ||ri,j ] is a binary vector with the prefix xi,j and the
suffix ri,j , f(·) is a function under the inversion processing,
and t, m are the parameters. In each row of the constructed
two-column table the first column element is [xi,0||ri,0] and
the second one is [xi,t||ri,t], i = 1, 2, ...,m. An illustration of
the table generation is displayed in Fig. 5.
In a general setting, the goal is to find an argument xi,j
such that [y||b] = f([xi,j ||a]) where y is a given image and
a, b are arbitrary. Consequently, in a general case, we employ
a dedicated constrained re-evaluation where the input for the
next iteration step is output of the previous step modified in
4a deterministic manner. Note that because, in a general case
the given image belong to a subset of all possible images, the
inversion results is not a unique one, i.e. we obtain one of
possible arguments which map into the given image.
TM-TO Based Inversion 
1 
Processor  
/ 
Time 
Table  
/ 
Memory 
Invertor 
challenge 
inversion of  
the challenge 
Fig. 4. Paradigm for solving the puzzle.
finding xi,j such that [y||b]=f(xi,j||a) where y is given and a,b are arbitrary 
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Fig. 5. Time-Memory Trade-Off Framework for the inversion.
III. THE BASIC APPROACH FOR THE CONSENSUS
This section yields a basic version of the consensus protocol
based on a dedicated TMD-TO.
The consensus protocol for inclusion of a new block into
the blockchain, we propose, consists of the preprocessing
algorithm and the protocol execution algorithms described in
the next two subsections.
For given encryption scheme EK(·), the inversion prob-
lem addressed is the following one: Recover a binary n-
dimensional key K which encrypts an n-dimensional all ones
vector 1n into a binary ciphertext with certain `-dimensional
prefix. Note that in this setting the space of the possible
challenges has dimension 2` and the inversion result is a point
in the space of dimension 2n, implying that the solution is not
unique. Note that, in an alternative setting it is possible to con-
sider inversion problem over a subspace of the (constrained)
inversion results where dimensions of the both spaces are the
same and equal to 2` - this setting is considered in the next
section.
For simplicity of explanation, we assume that each (ele-
mentary) node operates using a single table for each hardness
level of the puzzle. We also assume that the so called fed-
erated nodes could exist consisting of multiple independent
(elementary) nodes and each of the nodes employs a single
table.
A. Preparation Phase
The preparation phase should be performed only once and in
advance. During this phase certain table should be constructed
by each elementary node. During the protocol execution this
table is used for solving the puzzle.
The inputs for this phase are: (i) N - number of the points in
the space of all possible solutions of the inversion problem; (ii)
J - set of the parameters which specify the inversion problem
hardness, i.e. the puzzle difficulty.
For each level of the hardness/difficulty j ∈ J , a node with
the index i selects the following two appropriate (according
to the node criteria) space and energy budgets: a memory of
dimension M ji and the processing time parameter t
j
i . Note
that, in a general case, a node could select that for certain
difficulty levels the memory and time budgets are equal to
zero. For the selected parameters, the goal of the preparation
phase is to generate certain two columns table with M ji rows
employing the following Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Initialization of the two-columns table Mji
1) Input: Parameters n, tji , and M
j
i (number of the rows in
the table Mji ).
2) Randomly select M ji different n-dimensional vectors X0
and save them as the first column elements of the table
Mji .
3) For each row of the table Mji :
• perform the following recursive evaluation tji times
Xt = EXt−1(1
n) , t = 1, ...tji .
• Memorize the element Xtj
i
as the second column
element of the table Mji .
4) Output: Two-columns table Mji .
B. The Consensus Protocol
Proposal of the novel protocol for inclusion of a new
block into the blockchain follows the traditional paradigm
which involves construction of a candidate block and solving
certain puzzle in order to follow the consensus achieving
approach. The final verification of the blockchain updates
assumes that the longest extension of the previously verified
blockchain is accepted as the verified extension for the further
updates. The protocol we propose contains an alternative
5puzzle which should be performed over each candidate block
of the updates in order to achieve the verification consensus.
Each node which generates candidate blocks for inclusion into
the blockchain should execute the following Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Procedure for Inclusion of a New Block
into the Blockchain
1) Input: New block of the transactions.
2) Construction of the inversion challenge for considered
block of transactions.
3) Searching for solution of the given inversion challenge;
If the solution has been found go to the Step 5.
4) If execution of the Step 3 does not provide a solution for
the inversion, and if processing of the considered block
is still relevant go to Step 2; otherwise go to Step 6 (b).
5) Check the position for inclusion of the considered block
into the blockchain after the last already included valid
block if no one transaction of the block has already
been included in the blockchain; the validity of the
predecessor includes correctness check of the inversion
problem solution, as well.
6) Output: (a) New block inclusion into the blockchain; (b)
the failure flag that the block cannot be included into the
blockchain.
Two core components of the above algorithm for inclusion
of a new block into the blockchain are: (i) the algorithm which
specify construction of a challenge for the inversion; and (ii)
the algorithm for the inversion search. Proposals for these two
algorithms are as follows.
Algorithm 3: Construction of the Inversion Challenge
• Input: The considered block of transactions, and the
parameters d, `j
• Construction of the challenge:
1) Randomly select a nonce;
2) Evaluate the hash value of the binary representation
of the considered block concatenated with a nonce;
3) If the evaluated hash value has d-zeros prefix select
its `j suffix bits as the inversion challenge and go
to the Output; otherwise go to the Step 1.
• Output: Employed nonce and the inversion challenge C.
Algorithm 4: Search for a Solution of the Inversion
Challenge at the Node i for Given Difficulty Parameter j
• Input: The challenge C for inversion, the difficulty pa-
rameter j, the table Mji , and the parameter t
j
i .
• Search for the Challenge Inversion:
1) Check whether the challenge C is equal to `j-
dimensional suffix of certain second column ele-
ment of the tableMji ; If ”yes” record the row where
the overlapping has appeared and go to Step 5;
otherwise go to Step 3;
2) Set t = 0 and X0 = 1n−`
j ||C, i.e., X0 is a
concatenation of n− `j ones and the challenge C;
3) Set t = t + 1; if t > tji go to the Output (b);
Otherwise go to the Step 4;
4) Evaluate
Xt = EXt−1(1
n)
and check whether Xt is equal to certain second
column element of the table Mji ; If ”yes” record
the row index where the overlapping has appeared
and go to Step 5; otherwise go to Step 3;
5) Set X0 to the first column element corresponding
to the recorded row index, and perform iterative
evaluation Xt = EXt−1(1
n) until Xt has the suffix
C, and go to the Output (a);
• Output: (a) Set the inversion result as Xt−1; (b) the
inversion has not been performed.
IV. THE CONSENSUS PROTOCOL BASED ON THE
CONSTRAINED INVERSION PROBLEM
This section points out to an alternative version of the
previously proposed consensus protocol which corresponds
to the setting where the inversion solutions should be from
certain subspace of the entire space of possible solutions.
This setting appears as important one because it provides
an additional dimension for controlling the puzzle difficulty,
because the solution should be find within a subset of all
possible solutions for the inversion. Accordingly, this section
proposes the alternative versions of the Algorithms 1, and
4 which correspond to the consensus protocol based on the
constrained inversion problem.
Algorithm 1a: Initialization of the two-columns table Mji
1) Input: Parameters n, j, `j , tji , and M
j
i (number of the
rows in the table Mji ).
2) Randomly select M ji different n-dimensional vectors
X0; preset the first first n − `j bits of each vector to
all ones, and save them as the first column elements of
the table Mji .
3) For each row of the table Mji :
• for t = 1, ...tji perform the following:
- if t = 1 go to the next (evaluate) step, otherwise
preset the first n − `j bits of Xt−1 to 1 and go to
the evaluate step;
- evaluate
Xt = EXt−1(1
n) .
• Memorize the element Xtj
i
as the second column
element of the table Mji .
4) Output: Two-columns table Mji .
Recall that each node i should execute Algorithm 1a for all
values of the difficulty parameter j ∈ J .
6Algorithm 4a: Search for a Solution of the Inversion
Challenge at the Node i for the given Difficulty
Parameter j
• Input: The challenge C for inversion, the table Mji ,
and the parameter tji (corresponding to the difficulty
parameter j).
• Search for the Challenge Inversion:
1) Check whether the challenge C is equal to `j-
dimensional suffix of certain second column ele-
ment of the tableMji ; If ”yes” record the row where
the overlapping has appeared and go to Step 5;
otherwise go to Step 3;
2) Set t = 0 and X0 = 1n−`
j ||C, i.e., X0 is a
concatenation of n− `j ones and the challenge C;
3) Set t = t + 1; if t > tji go to the Output (b);
Otherwise go to the Step 4;
4) for t = 1, ...tji perform the following:
- if t = 1 go to the next (evaluate) step; otherwise
preset the first n− `j bits of Xt−1 to 1, and go to
the evaluate step;
- evaluate
Xt = EXt−1(1
n) ,
and check whether Xt is equal to certain second
column element of the table Mji ; If ”yes” record
the row index where the overlapping has appeared
and go to Step 5; otherwise go to Step 3;
5) Set X0 to the first column element corresponding
to the recorded row index, and perform iterative
evaluation Xt = EXt−1(1
n) until Xt has the suffix
C, and go to the Output (a);
• Output: (a) Set the inversion result as Xt−1; (b) the
inversion has not been performed.
Note that the obtained inversion result should begin with
1n−`
j
prefix, i.e., its prefix should contain a run of all ones
of length which corresponds to the considered difficulty.
V. SECURITY EVALUATION
Let Vi denotes i-th verification node and let V be the
set of all verification nodes. For the security evaluation, we
assume that the set V consists of two non-overlapping sets:
VH and VM corresponding to the honest and malicious nodes,
respectively. Also, let the chain is updated after each ∆-time
slot. In order to be the node which provides the next block
of the blockchain, a node should fulfill the following: (i) face
a puzzle solvable by the table in its possession; (ii) be the
first of solving the puzzle for a block with transactions which
are not included into the blockchain. In order to be secure,
the consensus protocol should be such that the chain version
generated by the nodes from VH is always longer than the
chain generated by the nodes from the set VM .
For the security evaluation, without loosing a generality,
we assume that each node is an elementary node which
employs a single table: In this model, a system node which
employs multiple tables could be considered as a consortium
of elementary nodes. Also, we assume that each table is
generated according to the requirements given in [6] and [2],
for example, so that we expect that all elements of the table
in the visible two columns, as well as in the hidden ones are
different. Let P ji , i ∈ V , be the probability that a node could
solve the puzzle, and let P jH and P
j
M denote the probabilities
that a node from the sets VH and VM , respectively, could solve
the puzzle of given difficulty j ∈ J .
Lemma 1. Assuming random and mutually independent
constructions of the tables for TM-TO corresponding to the
given difficulty j ∈ J , we have the following:
P ji =
DjiM
j
i t
j
i
N
, i ∈ V , (1)
P jJ =
∑
i∈VJ
DjiM
j
i t
j
i
N
, J = H,M , (2)
where N is equal to 2`
j
and 2n in the unconstrained and
constrained cases respectively, and Dji is the number of
employed challenges, i.e. number of the returns from Step 4
to Step 2 during an execution of the Algorithm 2.
Proof. Assuming the random model, we could expect that
2n−`
j
arguments X fulfils EX(1n) = C where we have
mapping {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`j . Accordingly, the probability
that inversion of the given C can be performed by the given
table is equal to M
j
i
tj
i
2`
j . On the other hand, when we consider
the constrained inversion where the first n − `j bits of the
inversion result should be ones, the probability of successful
inversion reduces for the factor 2−n+`
j
, i.e. the probability of
success becomes M
j
i
tj
i
2n . Finally, when there are D
j
i attempts
for the inversion employing Dji different challenges, the both
probabilities increase for the factor Dji .
Q.E.D.
According to Algorithm 4/4a, note that a node Vi for given
difficulty j ∈ J requires time tji for each attempt to preform
the requested inversion, and we assume that tmin ≤ tji ≤
tmax, Vi ∈ VJ , J = H,M . Also, we assume that δ denotes
the time required for generation of a challenge in the step 2
of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 1. Assuming that all nodes performs the elementary
operations with the same time complexity, a conservative
security condition which provides security of the blockchain
consensus protocol requires the following: For each value of
the difficulty parameter j ∈ J ,
b ∆
δ + tjmax
c
∑
i∈VH
M ji t
j
i > O(b
∆
δ + tjmin
c
∑
i∈VM
M ji t
j
i ) . (3)
Proof. For each j ∈ J , we have:
Dji = b
∆
δ + tji
c , i ∈ V (4)
and when tjmin ≤ tji ≤ tmax, tji ∈ VJ , J = H,M , for each i
and j,
∆
δ + tjmax
≤ Dji ≤
∆
δ + tjmin
(5)
7Consequently, within the time period ∆, each node from VH
could consider the puzzle solving for inclusion a block into the
blockchain at least b ∆
δ+tjmax
c times, and each node from VM
could consider the puzzle solving for inclusion a block into
the blockchain at most b ∆
δ+tj
min
c times. Accordingly, Lema 1
implies that the expected number of the new blocks included
into the blockchain by the nodes from VH is at least:
b ∆
δ + tjmax
c
∑
i∈VH
M ji t
j
i
N
, j ∈ J . (6)
Also, Lema 1 implies that the expected number of the new
blocks included into the blockchain by the nodes from VM is
at most:
b ∆
δ + tjmin
c
∑
i∈VM
M ji t
j
i
N
, j ∈ J . (7)
Consequently, a conservative condition that the number of new
blocks added to the chain by the nodes from the set VH is
always greater than the number of the new blocks added by
the nodes from the set VM can be specified as:
b ∆
δ + tjmax
c
∑
i∈VH
M ji t
j
i
N
>> b ∆
δ + tjmin
c
∑
i∈VM
M ji t
j
i
N
, (8)
for each j ∈ J . The above non-equality can be directly
rewritten obtaining a form claimed in the theorem statement.
QED.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION COMPLEXITY AND COMPARISON
A. Implementation Complexity
Implementation complexity of the proposed protocol con-
sists of the following two components: (i) the pre-processing
complexity which is required for the protocol initial setting;
and (ii) the processing complexity corresponds to each execu-
tion of the protocol.
The pre-processing complexity is complexity of generation
the tables employing Algorithm 1/1a, and it is just one-time
overhead.
The protocol processing (execution) complexity is deter-
mined by time and space complexities of the processing for
generation of a candidate block employing Algorithms 2-4/4a.
This processing consists of the complexity of mini-PoW and
the complexity of solving the inversion problem.
Assuming the notations introduced in the previous section,
the implementation and execution complexities of the pro-
posed consensus protocol at a node are summarized in the
following table.
TABLE I
TIME AND SPACE COMPLEXITIES OF THE PROPOSED CONSENSUS
PROTOCOL AT AN ELEMENTARY NODE i FOR A GIVEN DIFFICULTY j .
time complexity space complexity
pre-processing complexity O(Mji · tji ) O(Mji )
processing complexity O( ∆
δ+t
j
i
· tji ) O(Mji )
Consequently, the cumulative energy and space complexities
of the protocol within the entire system for adding one block
into the blockchain are as follows:
O(
∑
i
∆
δ + tji
· tji ))
O(
∑
j
∑
i
M ji )
respectively, where the summation is over all elementary nodes
i in the system, and the difficulties j ∈ J .
B. Comparison
For the comparison, we assume that all the considered
puzzles are related to a problem with a solution within a space
of N (different) points. We consider a single node and our goal
is to compare time and space complexities of PoW, PoS and
the consensus approach proposed in this paper in order that
all three approaches have the same probability P of success
in solving the corresponding puzzles.
Note that Algorithm 4 implies that the time complexity
of solving the puzzle is Dt where D is number of different
challenges employed and t corresponds to the time employed
for solving the puzzle. On the other hand, according to Lemma
1, the time complexity of the approach proposed in this paper
is: Dt = N ·PM where M corresponds to the space complexity
of the proposed approach.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE EXECUTION COMPLEXITIES AT A NODE ASSUMING
THAT THE THE EXPECTED PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS IS P AND THAT THE
COMPLEXITY OF SOLVING THE PUZZLE CORRESPONDS TO N , AND M IS A
PARAMETER M << N .
time complexity space complexity
PoW O(N · P ) O(1)
PoS O(1) O(N · P )
proposed approach O( N
M
P ) O(M)
According to the table, for example, when M = 230:
- the energy consumption is reduced about 230 times in com-
parison with PoW requirement at the expense of employing a
memory O(230);
- the required space is reduced for a factor ∼ N ·P230 times in
comparison with PoS requirement at the expense of increase
of the required energy for the same factor.
VII. CONCLUDING NOTES
The proposed consensus protocol provides a flexibility for
selection of the energy and space resources which should be
employed by a participating entity in the process of verification
of the blockchain updates. Security and complexity of the pro-
tocol could be controlled by a number of the parameters: the
processing time, dimension of the memory and the difficulty of
the considered puzzle, i.e. hardness of the inversion problem.
These parameters should be adjusted to the particular scenario
where the consensus protocol is employed. Accordingly, a
8player of the consensus protocol (a miner) could adjust the
(mining) strategy in order to fit the expenses into a desired
budget.
One of the options for implementation of the proposed con-
sensus protocol is its embedding into the Ethereum platform,
as reported in [12]. This implementation provides a trade-off
between the processing time and dimension of the employed
memory. Illustrative numerical examples of the possible trade-
offs between the processing time and required memory are also
pointed out.
An interesting issue for the further work could be a con-
sideration of the time vs. memory issues employing [1] as a
background.
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